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Over the last decade, the legal and institutional frameworks governing central 
banks and financial market regulatory authorities throughout the world have 
undergone significant changes. This has created new interest in better 
understanding the roles played by organizational structures, accountability and 
transparency in increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of central banks in 
achieving their objectives and ultimately yielding better economic outcomes. 
Although much has been written pointing out the potential role institutional form 
can play in central bank performance, little empirical work has been done to 
investigate the hypothesis that institutional form is related to performance. This 
paper attempts to help fill this void. 
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Keskuspankkien ja rahoitusmarkkinoiden valvontaviranomaisten institutionaali-
nen rakenne ja niiden toimintaa säätelevä lainsäädäntö ovat muuttuneet viimeisten 
vuosikymmenien aikana merkittävästi. Tästä kehityksestä on seurannut, että 
tutkijat ovat aiempaa aktiivisemmin halunneet selvittää, mitä keskuspankeille 
merkitsee tavoitteidensa saavuttamisen ja viime kädessä rahapolitiikan aikaan-
saannosten paranatamisen kannalta se, että ne uudistavat organisaatiorakenteitaan, 
kasvattavat tilivelvollisuuttaan ja lisäävät toimintansa läpinäkyvyyttä. Keskus-
pankin institutionaalisen rakenteen mahdollisista vaikutuksista keskuspankin 
suorituskykyyn on toki kirjoitettu runsaasti, mutta oletettujen vaikutusten tueksi 
on olemassa hyvin vähän empiiristä näyttöä. Tämä tutkimus pyrkii osaltaan 
paikkaamaan syntynyttä tutkimusvajetta. 
 
Avainsanat: keskuspankkitoiminta, institutionaalinen rakenne, tilivelvollisuus, 
läpinäkyvyys, suorituskyky 
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Over the last decade, the legal and institutional frameworks governing central 
banks and financial market regulatory authorities throughout the world have 
undergone significant changes. New central banks needed to be organized in the 
aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, and the desire was to establish 
institutions that would be the most effective in achieving central banking goals. At 
the same time, attention turned to some alleged corporate governance problems 
involving central banks (Frisell, Roszbach, and Spagnolo, 2007), as well as the 
widely publicized governance problems in large corporations like Enron. In 
addition, many long-established central banks have been examining the methods 
used to achieve their objectives, and as a result, many central banks have 
undergone changes to their institutional frameworks or methods of implementing 
monetary policy or provision of payment services in an attempt to make them 
more effective. 
  For example, in 1989, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand was given the ability 
to implement monetary policy without political influence. In 1997, the Bank of 
England gained more independence from the government and was given 
responsibility for setting monetary policy to achieve the government’s inflation 
target. Responsibility for bank supervision, which the Bank of England was given 
in 1987, was removed from the Bank of England’s duties in 1998 (Lybek and 
Morris, 2004). In the US, the Federal Reserve has recently undertaken a review of 
its approaches to monetary policy transparency and communication, which it is on 
record as saying plays an important role in democratic accountability and could 
help promote policy effectiveness. This review includes the way it communicates 
its economic objectives, its assessments of expected progress toward those 
objectives, and its economic projections (see, the Minutes of the Federal Open 
Market Committee Meetings of August 8, 2006 and January 30–31, 2007). In 
October 2007, the Federal Reserve announced it would be providing economic 
projections more often and with a longer forecast horizon, and in 2008, it 
implemented these changes. There is a growing body of literature that examines 
what procedures central banks should follow to set monetary policy most 
effectively (Blinder, 2004). Moreover, in light of the technological change taking 
place in the payments system from paper checks to check imaging and other 
electronic forms of payments, US Reserve Banks are rethinking their role in the 
payments system and the roles their branches perform within the Federal Reserve 
System. 
  This environment of change has created new interest in better understanding 
the roles played by organizational structures, accountability, and transparency in 
increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of central banks in achieving their 
objectives and ultimately yielding better economic outcomes. Lybek and Morris  
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(2004) survey the central bank laws in 101 countries and find that while central 
bank autonomy (ie, independence from the government) and accountability are 
generally accepted as good practice, there is less consensus regarding the 
structure, size, and composition of the governing bodies. Frisell, Roszbach and 
Spagnolo (2007) expand on this topic by examining the organizational structures 
in a group of mostly European central banks. The authors raise an important 
question of whether there is a trade-off between the accountability of central 
banks and their independence from the government in setting monetary policy. 
  While much has been written about the potential role that organizational 
structure can play in central banks, there has been little in the way of empirical 
study of the hypothesis that institution form is related to performance. We provide 
some preliminary evidence. Our paper asks two simple questions: first, can we 
find a significant statistical relationship between central bank structural 
characteristics, including board structure and goals, and economic outcomes that 
reflect the performance of central banks? Second, do these relationships differ 
across central banks operating in countries at different stages of economic 
development? Thus, our study adds to the growing literature on organizational 
form and central bank performance in two ways. First, while much of the 
literature has focused on developing measures of the governance structure of 
central banks, we attempt to provide statistical evidence on whether measures of 
structural and organizational form are significantly related to better economic 
outcomes. Second, while much of the literature has focused on the relatively 
developed countries, in this paper, we provide cross-country evidence.
1 We 
emphasize that our results must be viewed as suggestive rather than definitive. We 
have a relatively short time frame in our sample. Also, it is difficult to disentangle 
the direction of causality: does organizational form cause good performance, or 
does good performance lead to particular central bank organizational 
characteristics? We are limited in our ability to address this causality issue 
because of our short time series, so our results are best interpreted as correlations. 
Nonetheless, we believe that some of the significant relationships we find are 
sufficiently interesting to warrant further research on the important question of 
whether there is a discernable relationship between central bank institutional 
structure and economic performance. 
  The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
responsibilities of central banks, potential methods for achieving the goals, and 
our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses our data. Section 4 presents our empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
1 Our paper is related to Lybek (1999), which examines central bank autonomy, inflation, and 
economic growth in countries of the former Soviet Union. He was unable to do much in the way of 
statistical testing because not enough time had passed since the establishment of these new central 
banks.  
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2  Central bank responsibilities and corporate 
governance 
Goals. Central banks have several responsibilities and this multiplicity of goals 
raises interesting issues about how to measure performance.
2 As the literature 
suggests, while the tasks assigned to particular central banks have changed over 
the years, their key focus remains macroeconomic stability, including stable prices 
(low inflation), stable exchange rates (in some countries), and fostering of 
maximum sustainable growth (which may or may not be explicitly listed as a goal 
of the central bank in enabling legislation).
3,4 Most central banks have 
responsibility for stability of the payments and settlement system. (In their survey 
of 25 mostly European central banks, Frisell, Roszbach, and Spagnolo, 2007, 
found that 80 per cent list formulation and implementation of monetary policy as 
a major responsibility, and 75 per cent list oversight and regulation of the 
payments and settlement; see also Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2006, and Healey, 
2001.) Several central banks have some responsibility for directly supervising and 
examining commercial banks for safety and soundness. For example, in the US, 
commercial bank examination is spread among three federal agencies (the Federal 
Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation), with the responsible agency being determined by the 
bank’s charter. Other countries, like the UK, have removed bank supervision from 
the list of central bank responsibilities. Many central banks also deliver banking 
services to banks; these might include services related to cash, check, credit, 
and/or electronic payments (Fry, et al, 1999; Flannery, 1996). According to the 
Frisell, Roszbach, and Spagnolo survey (2007), in addition to monetary policy, 
the three most frequently mentioned objectives in the statutes of central banks in 
order are financial stability objectives, payments system objectives, and 
supervisory objectives. 
  Some central banks have an explicit mandate for achieving an output goal and 
a stable exchange rate. For example, according to Royal Decree, the Central Bank 
of Norway’s monetary policy ‘shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone’s 
national and international value, contributing to stable expectations concerning 
                                                 
2 Hüpkes, Quintyn, and Taylor (2006) discuss process-based performance criteria for financial 
supervisors. This methodology is not used in our paper, since we focus only on outputs. 
3 See, eg, Tuladhar (2005), Sibert (2003), Lybek (2002), McNamara (2002), and Healey (2001), 
Amtenbrink (1999), Maier (2007), and Caprio and Vittas (1995). 
4 Although monetary policy can affect only prices in the long run and cannot create output, price 
stability is a necessary condition for the economy to reach its full growth potential. In the US, the 
Federal Reserve Act specifies three goals for Fed monetary policy: maximum employment, stable 
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. Achievement of the third goal is expected to follow 
if the first two goals are achieved; hence, the Fed is usually spoken of as having a dual mandate. 
Other central banks, eg, Japan and New Zealand, have price stability as the sole goal of monetary 
policy.  
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exchange rate developments. At the same time, monetary policy shall underpin 
fiscal policy by contributing to stable developments in output and employment.’ 
(Royal Decree, 2001). The Reserve Bank of Australia is mandated by the Reserve 
Bank Act to ensure that its powers are ‘exercised in such a manner as, in the 
opinion of the Reserve Bank Board, will best contribute to: a) the stability of the 
currency of Australia; b) the maintenance of full employment in Australia; and c) 
the economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia’. (Section 10 (2) of 
the Reserve Bank Act of 1959). Other central banks do not have an explicit 
mandate to stabilize output, but most are expected to run policy to avoid 
instability in output and to help support sustainable growth. 
  The multiplicity of objectives makes central banks complicated institutions. 
Although central banks and governments care about seigniorage income and 
operating within their budgets, as public institutions, central banks are much less 
driven by the profit motive than are private corporations. So market profit does 
not serve as the relevant performance benchmark and incentive device. While 
measuring the performance of any one of the central bank’s goals might be 
doable, measuring performance across the central bank’s goals is more difficult, 
especially given the potential trade-offs among the goals. An important 
mechanism in the private sector for achieving better governance is market 
discipline, which requires transparency. Blinder (2004) and others have 
emphasized the importance of central bank transparency in both helping the 
central bank achieve its goals and increasing the degree of accountability to which 
it is subject. Transparency refers to the central bank communicating to the public 
and to the markets its goals and its rationale for actions taken to achieve its goals. 
As the role that expectations play in determining economic outcomes has become 
better understood, the importance of transparency in helping economic agents 
formulate well-founded expectations has risen. Thus, increased transparency can 
potentially have a direct role in improving economic performance. Transparency 
can also raise the degree of the central bank’s accountability for achieving its 
goals, which in turn, can positively influence central bank decision-making. 
  The multiplicity of central bank goals and the measurement difficulties 
suggest, however, that transparency may not be easily achieved, which makes 
accountability more difficult to impose. This leads one to ask whether there are 
ways of organizing the central bank as an institution that would lead to better 
incentives and thereby yield better economic outcomes. This might include 
structuring the decision-making board in a particular way, choosing the degree of 
autonomy to give to central bank decision-makers, or choosing the particular 
goals to assign to a central bank to the extent that there may be conflicts between 
the goals. 
  Central Bank Organizational Structure. A significant body of research on 
developed countries has examined whether a central bank’s independence from 
the government can increase its effectiveness in achieving its monetary policy  
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goals (eg, Alesina and Summers, 1993, Fischer, 1994, Cukierman, 2005, Maier, 
2007). By independence (which is also called ‘autonomy’ in some of the 
literature, eg, Lybek, 1999, 2002, Lybek and Morris, 2004, and Hayo and 
Hefeker, 2007), we mean that while the government may determine the goals of 
the central bank, the central bank controls the implementation of monetary policy 
to achieve those goals without direct approval of the executive branch of 
government. Partly this helps to insulate central bank decision-making from 
potentially conflicting goals of the government (eg, a short-run boost to growth at 
the expense of inflation or higher economic volatility over the longer run; 
inflating away the public debt, etc.). Evidence generally suggests that such 
independence can enhance central bank effectiveness, and the literature has found 
that developed countries that took steps to increase central bank independence 
after the 1970s experienced lower average inflation without a detriment to growth 
(Lybek, 1999). One of the earliest to do so was the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 
which until 1989 was under the operational control of the Minister of Finance and 
since then has been independent. While there has been a trend toward greater 
independence, the degree of independence varies among central banks. For 
example, in the US, the Federal Reserve’s goals are delineated by the US 
Congress in the Federal Reserve Act. The UK’s inflation target is set by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. In contrast, the Riksbank and the Reserve Bank of 
Australia set their own inflation targets. 
  There appears to be significant variation in organizational structures and 
institutional arrangements across central banks.
5 Different organizational 
structures might be better able to foster central bank independence. For example, 
in the US, it is argued that the structure of the Federal Reserve helps to foster 
independence. The seven members of the Board of Governors are appointed by 
the US president and confirmed by the Senate, but the Federal Reserve Bank 
presidents are chosen they their own Boards of Directors, with approval of the 
Board of Governors. Terms of the governors are 14 years, considerably longer 
than the US president’s or a US senator’s term. Thus, the structure of a central 
bank’s board might affect its ability to achieve central bank goals. Relevant 
characteristics might include the size of the board, whether the structure of the 
board is similar to that of a corporate board with both inside (central bank staff) 
and outside directors or whether it is made up of only central bank staff, the length 
of term and turnover rate of the board’s chair. 
  The corporate governance literature on private corporations suggests how 
some, but not all, of these characteristics should relate to better governance, and in 
turn, to better performance. For example, the literature suggests that boards with 
                                                 
5 Tuladhar (2005) surveyed the differences in governing bodies of countries that have adopted 
inflation targeting to implement monetary policy. Eijffinger and Geraats (2002) and Frisell, 
Roszbach and Spagnolo (2007) surveyed differences in the institutional structures of the central 
banks in several, mainly European, countries.  
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inside and outside directors generally offer stronger governance. However, it is 
not clear if this is true in a central bank setting. Moreover, it is not clear, a priori, 
how some of the organizational characteristics might relate to performance. For 
example, a larger board helps to bring a diversity of views and skills to the 
decision-making process, which can arguably lead to better decision-making, but 
it also can make it more difficult to reach decisions or dilute accountability among 
members for the board’s decisions, which could be detrimental to outcomes. 
Similarly, as Lybek (1999) points out, higher turnover among governors is 
typically interpreted as indicating less autonomy, but it might also indicate that 
the governor is more embedded and more susceptible to government interference. 
Or it might indicate a well-functioning imposition of accountability, depending on 
the reasons for turnover. Our empirical work discussed below investigates 
whether there is a significant correlation between several organizational 




3  Data and measures 
One of the difficulties in implementing our cross-country study is obtaining data 
on a consistent set of measures across countries. We wanted to include as many 
countries as we could, but that meant having fewer variables describing central 
bank organizations. Another challenge was assessing the consistency of the data 
over time. Finally, we had to evaluate the quality of the data, which varies from 
country to country. We use data from multiple sources. We extensively use the 
websites of central banks and in some cases information that individual central 
banks provided to us upon our request. Our other data sources include Thomson’s 
(Bureau van Dijk) Bankscope database (also known as Fitch’s International Bank 
Database); IMF International Financial Statistics; BIS publications of Blue 
Books and Orange Books; annual reports of individual central banks; World 
Development Indicators (WDI); the Polity IV project of the Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management at the University of 
Maryland; and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999). We did 
substantial editing and cross-checking to produce as clean a data set as possible. 
  The data used in our analysis are annual data from 1996 to 2000. To ensure 
that enough time had elapsed since the establishment of the central banks in our 
sample, we included countries whose central banks were established in 1993 or 
earlier (which allowed us to include the countries of the former Soviet Union). 
Because how well central banks perform and the relationship between 
performance and central bank characteristics may differ across countries that vary 
in the degree of economic development, we classified the countries into three  
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groups: transition economies, developing economies, and developed economies. 
This might also help to provide some control (admittedly weak) for direction of 
causality to the extent that the central banks and their characteristics are relatively 
newer in the transition economies than in the developed economies.
6 (Results for 
statistical tests of equality of the set of coefficients across the groups of countries 
are discussed below. We also discuss two robustness tests that use alternative 
groupings of countries.) Appendix Table A1 lists the countries in our analysis. 
  Our basic regressions, which we estimate via OLS, are of the form 
 
ܲ௜௧ ൌߙ ଴ ൅ߙ ଵݔ௜௧ ൅ߙ ଶܻ݁ܽݎଵଽଽ଻ ൅ߙ ଷܻ݁ܽݎଵଽଽ଼ ൅ߙ ସܻ݁ܽݎଵଽଽଽ ൅ߙ ହܻ݁ܽݎଶ଴଴଴ ൅ߝ ௜௧ 
 
where ܲ௜௧ is a performance measure, ݔ௜௧ is a vector of central bank characteristics, 
ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ is a dummy variable = 1 if the year is t and 0 otherwise (note we omit the 
1993 variable), and ߝ௜௧ is an error term.
7 
  Performance Measures. Since central banks have several goals, we examine 
several different performance measures. All variables are annual for the years 
1996 to 2000. Appendix Table A2 gives the definitions and sources of each 
variable.
8 
  Price stability is viewed as one of the major objectives pursued by central 
banks. Although a price-level target rather than an inflation target has been 
pursued by at least one central bank in the past (Sweden in the 1930s) (Berg and 
Jonung, 1999), most central banks have opted for trying to control inflation and 
aim for low and stable inflation. Thus, we investigate the following inflation 
performance measures 
 
Inflationit  =  annual CPI inflation rate in country i in year t, 
Abs(Inflation)it   =  absolute value of annual CPI inflation rate in country i 
in year t, which acknowledges that countries can miss 
hitting their goal of price stability via deflation as well 
as inflation. 
Inflation variabilityit  =  standard deviation of the inflation rate in country i over 
the years t-2, t-1, t. Since our regression time frame 
runs from 1996 to 2000, this measure incorporates 
annual inflation rates from 1994 and 1995, as well as 
1996 to 2000. 
                                                 
6 The direction of causality could be better identified if we had time series data on central bank 
characteristics and those central bank characteristics varied over time. Unfortunately, such data 
were not available. 
7 Note we also ran the regressions including a quadratic time trend (ie, trend and trend-squared 
variables) instead of the set of time dummy variables, with virtually no difference in results in 
terms of coefficient magnitudes or levels of significance. 
8 In contrast to the performance measures based on economic outcomes that we use here, Hüpkes, 
Quintyn, and Taylor (2006) discuss process-based performance criteria for financial supervisors.  
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We also examine a measure published by the Heritage Foundation, which is a 
component of the Foundation’s ‘Economic Freedom Index’ 
 
Heritage monetary performance indexit = 
  index that measures the success of a country’s monetary policy based on 
two components: the weighted average inflation rate over the most recent 
three years and the degree to which a country imposes price controls. The 
index varies from 0 to 100, with lower inflation and lack of price controls 
yielding higher scores. A country with inflation of 10 per cent and no 
price controls would have a score of 80, while a country with inflation of 
2 per cent would have a score of 91 (Beach and Kane, 2007). 
 
We examine two output performance measures. Although in the long run, 
monetary policy cannot affect real variables, we are interested in examining 
whether certain organizational characteristics of central banks are associated with 
higher or lower output, as well as whether they are associated with higher or 
lower output volatility. Thus, we examine 
 
Real growthit   =  annual growth rate of real GDP in country i in year t, 
and, 
Real growth variabilityit    =  standard deviation of annual growth rate of real 
GDP in country i over the years t-2, t-1, t.
9 
 
Since there can be short-run trade-offs between price and output stabilization, we 
wanted to examine a performance measure that would incorporate both goals. As 
discussed in Mester (2003), there is a long literature that looks at monetary policy 
reaction functions, or Taylor-type rules for monetary policy (see Taylor, 1999, for 
a survey, and Hetzel, 2000, for a critique of the Taylor-rule literature). Such a rule 
relates the policy instrument to targets for inflation and output gap or the 
unemployment rate (ie, it relates the instrument to macroeconomic variables). It 
also assumes that the economic dynamics imply a trade-off between inflation and 
the output gap or unemployment (ie, it is based on an underlying Philips curve). 
According to Orphanides (2003) and Taylor (1999), Taylor’s rule appears to 
perform well in a variety of models and appears to be robust to different model 
specifications. 
  Such a rule can be derived from a model of the economy in which the central 
bank’s goal is to stabilize output and inflation (ie, to minimize a weighted sum of 
the unconditional variances of inflation and the output gap). We do not have a 
                                                 
9 We note Lybek’s (1999) caution that there are measurement issues with using GDP as a measure 
of output in transition economies before privatization was complete. He suggests that the GDP 
numbers may have exaggerated real output prior to privatization and understated it after because of 
economic agents’ desire to evade taxes.  
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measure of the output gap for our countries, nor do we know the central banks’ 
weights, but to get at this idea, we assume equal weights, and examine the 
performance measure 
 
Inflation and real growth variabilityit = 0.5 Inflation variabilityit + 0.5 Real 
growth variabilityit. 
 
To get at the issue of financial stability, we examined the performance of the 
banking system, as given by 
 
Problem loansit  =  problem loan volume as a percentage of total loan volume in 
country i in year t. 
 
Since some central banks are given the mandate to enact policies to stabilize the 
value of the country’s currency on international markets within an exchange rate 
regime chosen by the government, we also examine 
 
Exchange rate variabilityit  =  standard deviation of the exchange rate in country i 
within year t based on the monthly data available 
in International Financial Statistics published by 
the IMF. 
 
Central Bank Characteristics. We focus on central bank characteristics that are 
related to organizational structure and that could potentially be correlated with the 
central bank’s effectiveness in achieving its goals as reflected in our performance 
measures. 
  Our measures, which do not vary over our sample period for the countries 
included in this study, are as follows 
 
Independentit  =  1 if the central bank has autonomy from the government 
in implementing monetary policy (even if it does not 
necessarily have independence in setting its goals), and 0 
otherwise. Evidence on developed countries suggests that 
central bank independence yields better economic 
outcomes. Certainly many of the new central banks have 
been organized with this in mind. We seek to see if we 
can find this in our data for transition and developing 
countries, as well as whether we can find a significant 
result for developed countries and for which performance 
measure. 
Directorsi  =  number of directors on the central bank’s board in 
country i, and  
16 
Outside directorsi  =  percentage of outside directors on the central bank’s 
governing board in country i. 
 
As discussed above, the number of directors could be positively related to 
performance to the extent that more minds yield better decision-making, but at 
some point the size could hinder decision-making by making it difficult to reach a 
consensus or making it difficult to achieve individual accountability. While the 
finance literature suggests that outside directors can monitor insiders to help 
achieve better outcomes, the work of the central bank can be arcane, so finding 
outsiders with the necessary skills and knowledge might be difficult. This might 
be especially true in countries that have recently adopted market economies, 
where the pool of experienced market economists is not large. Hence, the 
relationship between these variables and economic performance is a priori 
ambiguous. 
  Some of the literature, eg, Berger, de Haan and Eijffinger (2001) and 
Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992), has examined the turnover rate of the 
central bank governor (or chairman of the board). High turnover may suggest less 
independence from the government, which might have a negative impact on 
central bank effectiveness, but it could also signal the exit of less effective 
management. Hence, its effect on performance, if any, is not a prior clear. Thus, 
we examine the measure 
 
Turnoveri  = average rate of turnover of central bank governors since 1993, 
measured as the total number of unserved years since 1993 as a 
percentage of the length of a governor’s term specified by law 
divided by the number of governors since 1993.
10 
 
Similarly, the length of the governor’s term might be related positively to 
performance if it means less government interference or negatively to 
performance if it means the governor is embedded in the institution and insulated 
from scrutiny. In some cases, there is no specified length of term for the governor. 
Thus, we include two variables in the analysis 
 
Term unspecifiedi  = 1 if the length of the governor’s term in country i is 
unspecified and = 0 otherwise, and, 
Term lengthi  =  0 if the governor’s term is unspecified and = number of 
years in the governor’s term in country i, otherwise. Note 
that while this can potentially vary over time if there were 
changes in the specified term of the governor in a country 
                                                 
10 In calculating this variable for countries that do not specify a term length, we assume the term 
length is 10 years, which is longer than the term length for any country in our sample that specifies 
a term length.  
17 
during our period of study (1996–2000), this does not 
occur in our sample. 
 
Finally, central banks vary according to whether they have banking supervisory 
responsibilities along with monetary policy. Indeed, a number of central banks 
have been reconsidering whether bank supervision and monetary policy create 
potential conflicts of interest or whether there are synergies between the two 
(Bhattacharya, Boot, and Thakor, 1998). For example, bank supervision was 
separated from the Bank of England in 1998. To examine this issue, we include an 
indicator variable 
 
Supervisioni =  1 if the central bank has bank supervisory responsibilities as well 
as monetary policy responsibilities and = 0 otherwise.  
 
 
4 Statistical  results 
Difference-in-means tests. Table 4.1 presents difference-in-means tests for the 
variables across the three sets of countries in our analysis: transitional economies, 
developing economies, and developed countries. One might expect that there 
would be more similarity between the transition and developing countries in terms 
of economic performance than between the transition and developed countries. It 
is not clear that that would necessarily be true of the central bank organizational 
characteristics to the extent that transition countries might look to the more 
established banks in developed countries as role models. 
  As shown in the table, many of the performance variables and central bank 
characteristics are significantly different across the countries in our sample. In 
particular, not surprisingly, transition economies have significantly higher levels 
and variability of inflation than developing or developed countries. The average 
inflation rate for transition economies in our sample was 20 per cent compared 
with 10 per cent for developing economies and slightly above 2 per cent for 
developed countries. In contrast, there is no significant difference across the three 
groups in terms of annual real GDP growth, which averages about 3.5 to 3.75 per 
cent. But there is a significant difference in variability, with the transition 
economies experiencing the most volatile and the developed countries 
experiencing the least volatile output growth. Transition countries experience a 
higher percentage of problem loans than the other countries, but still a relatively 
low 6.5 per cent of total loans. These measures suggest that transition economies 
experienced a more volatile economic environment during the second half of the 
1990s, the time period of study, than did other economies. 
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Table 4.1  Difference-in-means tests across country groups 
 
Variable name  Mean 






 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Inflation   20.01**,†††    10.33‡‡‡    2.19 
    (36.70)   (15.54)   (1.97) 
Abs (Inflation)    20.08**, †††    10.52‡‡‡    2.33 
    (36.67)   (15.41)   (1.8) 
Inflation variability    78.42**, ††    9.68‡    0.88 
   (326.84)    (75.84)    (0.77) 
Heritage  monetary   49.49***,  †††  69.85‡‡‡  83.8 
performance  index    (27.01)   (14.55)   (4.93) 
Real  growth    3.77   3.56   3.59 
    (4.37)   (3.64)   (2.39) 
Real growth variability    3.51**,  †††   2.64‡‡‡   1.27 
    (3.41)   (2.38)   (1.3) 
Inflation and real growth    40.97**, ††    6.28‡‡    1.05 
variability   (163.53)    (39.18)    (0.85) 
Problem  loans   6.58**,  †††   5.25‡‡‡   3.82 
    (5.62)   (5.23)   (4.39) 
Exchange rate variability   7.10    34.51‡‡   5.13 
   (9.27)    (231.31)    (14.51) 
Directors   8.22***,  ††   7.13‡‡‡   9.48 
    (2.62)   (2.66)   (4.87) 
Outside directors (%)    14.15***    27.17‡‡‡    16.63 
    (19.98)   (29.63)   (25.75) 
Term  unspecified    0.052   0.096   0.111 
    (0.224)   (0.295)   (0.315) 
Term length    5.58***, ††    3.94‡‡‡    5.07 
    (1.57)   (1.70)   (2.04) 
Turnover   0.292†††  0.288‡‡‡  0.15 
    (0.212)   (0.207)   (0.09) 
Independent    0.211***,  †††  0.077‡‡‡  0.777 
    (0.410)   (0.267)   (0.417) 
Supervision   0.421**   0.31‡‡   0.41 
   (0.496)   (0.46)   (0.49) 
Age   30.63***,  †††   44.46‡‡‡    119.55 
    (30.92)   (25.21)   (81.05) 
*, **, *** denote transition country mean significantly different from developing country 
mean at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
†, ††, ††† denote transition country mean significantly different from developed country 
mean at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
‡, ‡‡, ‡‡‡ denote developing country mean significantly different from developed 







In terms of organizational characteristics, central banks do seem to differ across 
the country groups. In particular, there is a higher level of central bank 
independence from the executive branch of government in transition and 
developed countries than in developing countries (21 per cent and 78 per cent of 
the central banks in the transition and developed countries, respectively, are 
independent vs. about 8 per cent in developing countries). This is probably not 
that surprising, since independence is thought to be a best practice among central 
banks. Several of the central banks in the developed world have sought more 
independence, while the new central banks in the transition countries organized 
themselves with high degrees of independence from the beginning. 
  Board size does not differ that much among the country groups (although the 
differences are statistically different), with average size ranging from 8 to 10 
members. Developed countries tend to have a higher percentage of outside 
directors on their boards (27 per cent) vs. transition and developed countries (14 
to 17 per cent). For those countries that specify a definite term for their central 
banks governor, the average terms are quite similar across countries, varying 
between about six years in transition countries, four years in developing countries, 
and five years in developed countries. The turnover rate of governors since 1993 
is quite low in all countries, but lowest in the developed countries. 
  In terms of whether the central bank has responsibility for commercial bank 
supervision as well as monetary policy, it appears that fewer than half have joint 
responsibility in all three country groups. There is no significant difference 
between transition and developed countries, where about 40 per cent of the central 
banks have responsibility for both of these tasks. In developing countries, the 
fraction is significantly lower at 30 per cent. Finally, although we do not use age 
as an independent regressor, central banks in developed countries are quite a bit 
older than those in transition or developing countries – not at all a surprise. 
  The differences in performance measures and central bank governance 
characteristics across the country groups in our sample suggest that there could be 
significant differences in the relationship between our central bank institutional 
variables and performance, if indeed, such a relationship can be uncovered in the 
data at all. 
  Regression analysis. Table 4.2 presents the regression results. The first thing 
to notice is that there do appear to be some significant associations between 
performance and governance characteristics of central banks. But, on the whole, it 
would be difficult to reach a definitive conclusion that central bank organizational 
characteristics have strong correlations with economic performance, either 
positively or negatively. The second thing to notice is that the regression 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We tested the null hypotheses of equal coefficients across the country groups. 
These were implemented by estimating for each performance measure a 
regression that includes all of the coefficients, allowing them to differ across 
country groups and then testing, via F-tests, restrictions of equality of the 
coefficients on the variables (excluding the year dummy variables) of the pairs of 
country groups and across all three country groups.
11 We could not reject at 
standard significance levels the null hypothesis of equal coefficients for the 
problem loans and the exchange rate variability performance measures, suggesting 
there are no significant differences in the relationship between these measures and 
central bank characteristics across country groups.
12 However, for the other 
performance measures we reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients in all 
cases for the transition countries relative to the developing or developed countries. 
We also reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients across developing and 
developed countries for the performance measures involving inflation. 
  If instead of testing whether the set of coefficients is equal across the country 
groups, we test coefficient by coefficient, we find that for each performance 
measure (including problem loans and exchange rate variability), we can reject the 
null hypothesis for at least one coefficient. Given these results, we will proceed by 
examining the results of the regressions that were estimated separately for each 
country group. As a robustness test, we also investigated two other groupings of 
our countries. These results are discussed below. 
  Inflation performance. As shown in Table 4.2, with regard to inflation and 
inflation variability, larger boards are associated with higher and more variable 
inflation for developed countries, but there is an insignificant association for 
transition and developing countries. Longer governor terms or those with 
indeterminate length are associated with lower inflation in transition and 
developing countries. These longer terms might imply that the governor is less 
subject to government intervention, which might produce better inflation results. 
However, when we look at the independence of the central bank, we find a 
significant negative association with inflation only for the transition economies. 
We find a significantly positive association for developing and developed 
economies (ie, central bank independence is associated with worse inflation 
performance in these countries), which is contrary to the received wisdom. We did 
not find a significant relationship between independence and inflation variability. 
  We find some evidence that having the central bank involved in both bank 
supervision and monetary policy is associated with worse inflation outcomes in 
terms of level and variability, since the coefficient on supervision is significant for 
developed countries in both of these inflation regressions. 
                                                 
11 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
12 For exchange rate variability, the null hypothesis of equal coefficients for developed and 
developing countries could be rejected at the 13 per cent level of significance.  
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  The results for the Heritage Foundation’s monetary performance index, 
reported on the last page of Table 2, are quite similar to those for inflation, 
although the significance levels are higher.
13 This is not too surprising given that 
the measure is based on inflation rates (and whether the country uses price 
controls). (Recall that higher inflation levels are associated with lower levels of 
the index.) 
  Output performance. In terms of output, we find only marginally significant 
associations between output level and central bank organizational characteristics. 
For output performance, perhaps the better measure is variability, since central 
banks have little influence on the level of output in the longer run. Here we find 
little association between the size of the board, percentage of outside directors, 
governor term, or governor turnover and performance. We do find that central 
bank independence seems to result in lower output variability. This result is the 
opposite of what one might expect if there is a short-run trade-off between 
inflation and output variability and the government favors stabilizing output rather 
than inflation. Instead, our results suggest that independent central banks do not 
act in a way that neglects output stabilization. 
  We find some evidence that independence is negatively associated with 
overall variability, as measured by the equally weighted sum of inflation 
variability and real growth variability – significantly so in developed countries, 
with the negative association with output variability dominating the positive 
association with inflation variability. 
  Other performance measures. We find little association between health of the 
commercial banking system as measured by the percentage of problem loans in a 
country and central bank organizational characteristics. There is a slight negative 
relationship between the percentage of outside directors on the central bank’s 
governing board and problem loans. However, we don’t want to read much into 
this. The regression adjusted R-squareds are very low, and even negative, for the 
developed countries regression. 
  For exchange rate variability, the most significant associations are found in 
the transition economies. This is perhaps not surprising given that stabilization of 
exchange rates is more likely to be an important goal of central banks in these 
countries compared with those in developed countries. In transition economies, 
central banks with larger boards, fewer outside directors, and longer governor 
terms have higher variability. But higher turnover among the governors and more 
central bank independence are associated with more stable exchange rates. 
  We need to be cautious in interpreting our results, remembering that we have 
a relatively short time frame in our sample. The lack of strong significance could 
merely reflect the lack of a long enough time frame over which there has been 
                                                 
13 The adjusted R-squareds for transition and developed countries are higher in the regressions 
using the Heritage monetary performance index than in the regressions using inflation as the 
performance measure.  
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enough variation in economic outcomes. We also emphasize that these are 
correlations. Our results do not permit interpretations of causality. Nonetheless, 
we find that the relationships differ across country groups and some of the 
significant associations are sufficiently surprising to merit further exploration. 
  Alternative specifications. We investigated several alternative specifications 
of the performance regressions.
14 
 
(1) The inflation performance measures presented thus far imply that performance 
deteriorates in a linear fashion as inflation increases. We wanted to investigate 
another measure of inflation performance that would penalize inflations and 
deflations, with larger inflations and larger deflations representing more than 
proportionate deterioration in performance. Thus we investigated an alternative 
inflation measure 
 
Inflation squaredit = annual CPI inflation squared in country i in year t. 
 
The results differ little from the results for the absolute value of inflation 
presented. 
 
(2) We investigated whether countries that implement monetary policy via 
inflation targeting have better outcomes than those that do not use inflation 
targeting. First, we entered a dummy variable indicator of inflation targeting into 
the regressions. Second, we estimated separate regressions for the inflation-
targeting and non-inflation-targeting countries, by country group. Our results 
suggest that in most cases inflation targeting doesn’t appear to have a significant 
relationship to performance outcomes or to change results reported in Table 4.2 in 
any significantly way. When inflation targeting is significant, it is more often 
significant for the developing country group, and interestingly its correlation is 
with worse, not better performance (higher inflation and inflation variability, 
lower output growth and higher output variability). This might be evidence of 
reverse causality – countries that have had poor outcomes may have implemented 
inflation targeting. 
 
(3) Finally, we investigated whether significant correlations would survive if 
instead of dividing our countries into groups according to the degree of economic 
development we used some other typology. We investigated two. First, we used 
data from the Polity IV project of the Center for International Development and 
Conflict Management at the University of Maryland to divide countries into 
groupings based on the degree to which their governments are more democratic 
and less autocratic. The dataset includes a policy score that is computed by 
                                                 
14 All of these results are available from the authors upon request.  
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subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score, yielding a polity score 
that ranges from –10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). We 
divided the 87 of our 96 countries for which there were polity scores into three 
groups based on the country’s average polity score from 1996–2000. There were 
19 countries in the least democratic group (which we defined as average polity 
score < 0); there were 40 countries in the middle group (with average polity score 
from 0 to 9); and there were 28 countries in the most democratic group (with 
average policy score = 10). 
  We find that at least some central bank characteristics remain significantly 
related to economic performance in each of the polity country groupings. Which 
particular variables are significant differs by performance measure, as it did in the 
regressions based on country groups categorized by level of economic 
development. There is no particular polity group that exhibits a stronger 
relationship between central bank characteristics and performance than another 
polity group; it depends on performance measure. 
  Our second typology was based on the origin of the country’s legal system. A 
large body of work has found that a country’s legal origin is correlated with 
economic and financial development (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer, forthcoming). For a large set of countries (which includes all the 
countries in our analysis), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1999) provide information on whether the origin of the country’s legal system is 
German, Scandinavian, British (ie, common law), or Socialistic. Since La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny find that governments in countries with 
French or Socialistic legal origins performed worse than those with British legal 
origins, we grouped our countries into three groups: those with German or 
Scandinavian legal origins (11 of our 96 countries), those with French or 
Socialistic legal origins (53 of our 96 countries), and those with British legal 
origins (32 of our 96 countries). 
  Again we find that some central bank characteristics remain significant in 
each of the country groups categorized by legal origins.
15 Thus, our general 
conclusion from this investigation of alternative country groupings is that the 
significant relationships we found between central bank characteristics and 
performance for countries grouped by level of economic development were not 
driven by the country grouping per se. 
 
 
                                                 
15 In the grouping of countries with German and Scandinavian legal origins, the supervision 
variable, indicating whether the central bank was involved in bank supervision as well as monetary 
policy, had to be excluded from the regressions since these roles are separated in these countries.  
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5 Conclusions 
Over the last decade, the legal and institutional frameworks governing central 
banks and financial market regulatory authorities throughout the world have 
undergone significant changes. As new central banks have arisen in the aftermath 
of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, as corporate governance problems have 
surfaced in some central banks, as central banks have had to rethink some of their 
operations in the wake of changing payments technologies, and as more is learned 
about effective implementation of monetary policy, the organizational structure of 
central banks has become an area of research interest. There is new interest in 
better understanding the roles played by organizational structures, accountability, 
and transparency in increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of central banks in 
achieving their objectives and ultimately yielding better economic outcomes. 
  Although much has been written pointing out the potential role institutional 
form can play in central banks, little empirical work has been done to investigate 
this hypothesis. To fill this void, our paper asks two simple questions: first, can 
we find a significant statistical relationship between central bank institutional 
characteristics and economic outcomes that reflect the performance of central 
banks? Second, do these relationships differ across central banks operating in 
countries at different stages of economic development? 
  In answer to our first question, our findings suggest that there are some 
significant associations, but that there is no definitive conclusion that central bank 
organizational structure has strong correlations with economic performance, either 
positively or negatively. For example, we did not find a strong correlation 
between the size of the board and the percentage of outside directors on the board 
with performance. Moreover, in some cases, the associations are not the expected 
ones. For example, we find that the central bank’s independence from the 
executive branch of the government is not always significantly related to 
performance and in some cases the relationship is the opposite of what one might 
expect. In developed countries, while independence is significantly associated 
with lower output variation and with lower weighted price and output variation, 
we find a positive association between independence and inflation. We also find 
this positive association for developing countries, while we find a significant 
negative relationship for the set of transition countries. 
  In answer to our second question, we do find that the relationship between 
performance and central bank organizational characteristics differs across 
countries at different stages of economic development. 
  We need to be cautious in interpreting our results, remembering that we have 
a relatively short time frame in our sample. The lack of strong significance could 
merely reflect the lack of a sufficiently long time frame over which there has been 
enough variation in economic outcomes. Or our results could provide an  
28 
explanation of Lybek and Morris’s (2004) finding that there is little consensus 
among central banks regarding the structure, size, and composition of their 
governing bodies. Nonetheless, several of the associations we find are sufficiently 
surprising as to merit future exploration. 
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Appendix 
Table A1.1  Countries included in the empirical work 
 
Transition Economies: 
  Albania, Armenia, Belarus, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine 
 
Developing Economies: 
  Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Ethopia, Fiji, Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Lesotho, Macau, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
Developed Economies: 
  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States 
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Table A1.2  Variable definitions 
 
Variable name  Definition  Data source  Year 
Performance Measures    
Inflation  Annual CPI inflation rate   Calculation based on 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 2005 
Data Disk 
1996–2000 
Abs (Inflation)  Absolute value of the annual 
CPI inflation rate 
Calculation based on 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 2005 
Data Disk 
1996–2000 
Inflation squared  Annual CPI inflation rate 
squared 
Calculation based on 
WDI 2005 Data Disk 
1996–2000 
Inflation variability  Standard deviation of annual 
CPI inflation rate over the 
previous 3 years 
Calculation based on 




An index measuring the 
success of the country’s 
monetary policy based on the 
weighted average inflation over 
the most recent three years and 
the degree to which a country 
imposes price controls, as 
determined by the Heritage 
Foundation as part of its Index 




Real growth  Annual growth rate of real 
GDP 
WDI 2005 Data Disk  1996–2000 
Real growth 
variability 
Standard deviation of annual 
real GDP growth over the 
previous 3 years 
Calculation based on 
WDI 2005 Data Disk 
1996–2000 
Inflation and real 
growth variability 
An equally weighted average 
of the standard deviation of 
annual CPI inflation over the 
previous 3 years and the 
standard deviation of annual 
GDP growth over the previous 
3 years   
Calculation based on 
WDI 2005 Data Disk 
1996–2000 
Problem loans  Problem loan ratio = dollar 
volume of problem loans as a 
percent of dollar volume of 
total loans 
Bankscope database  1996–2000 
Exchange rate 
variability 
Standard deviation of the 
exchange rate from 
monthly data   
IMF International 





Variable name  Definition  Data source  Year 
Characteristics of the Central Bank 
Directors  Number of directors on the 
central bank’s board 
Calculation based on 
IMF IFS  
1996–2000 
Outside directors  Number of outside members 
on the board as a percent of 
total number of directors on 
the board 
Calculation based on 
IMF IFS  
1996–2000 
Term unspecified  Indicator variable = 1 if no 
definite term of the central 
bank’s governor (ie, 
chairman of the board) is 
specified by law; 0 otherwise 
Morgan Stanley Central 
Bank Directory, 
Individual Websites, and 
E-mails. 
1996–2000 
Term length  If a definite term of the 
central bank’s governor is 
specified by the law, the 
number of years in a full 
term; 0 otherwise 
Morgan Stanley Central 
Bank Directory, 
Individual Websites and 
E-mails. 
1996–2000 
Turnover  Turnover of governor = 
Average rate of turnover of 
central bank governors since 
1993, measured as number of 
unserved years as percentage 
of term of the governor 
divided by total number of 
governors since 1993 
Morgan Stanley Central 
Bank Directory, 
Individual Central Bank 
Websites, and Direct 
Correspondence via 
email with the Central 
Banks 
1996–2000 
Independent  Dummy variable = 1 if the 
central bank is not part of the 
Ministry of Finance and can 
implement monetary policy 
without the direct approval of 
the government, and = zero 
otherwise. 
Websites, Other research 
papers: Cukierman, 
(1992), (1994), 
Cukierman et al. (1992), 
(1995), de Haan and 
Kooi (2000) and de Haan 
and Van’t Hag (1995), 
Mangano (1998), 
Loungani and Sheets 
(1997), and the European 




Supervision  Dummy variable = 1 if the 
central bank is involved in 
bank supervision as well as 
monetary policy, and = 0 
otherwise 
Websites, Other 
Research Papers (see list 




Age  The number of years since 
the founding of the central 
bank 
Morgan Stanley Central 
Bank Directory, 
Individual Central Bank 
Websites, and Direct 
Correspondence via 
email with the Central 
Banks 
1996–2000 
Inflation target  Dummy variable = 1 if 
central bank implements 
monetary policy by setting a 
numerical inflation target and 
= 0 otherwise 
Websites, Other 
Research Papers (see list 
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